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INTRODUCTION 
 
An eighteen-year-old high school football player is one of the nation’s 
few five-star national recruits. Scouts have continuously described him as 
one of the elite college prospects in the country with excellent pro potential. 
He arrives at the University of Michigan for his first official visit and is 
awe-struck. The state of the art locker rooms and best indoor practice 
facilities in the nation overwhelm him. He is torn. His heart has always been 
with Rutgers. His destiny was to play as a Scarlet Knight; his grandfather 
played for the 11-0 undefeated Scarlet Knights in 1976, and regularly 
divulged in anecdotes about “The Birthplace of College Football” growing 
up. Even so, he steps onto the Big-Ten campus, lying in the heart of Ann 
Arbor, Michigan, and is astounded. Next on his list of official visits sits 
Ohio State, and he knows the Buckeyes also have the total package. These 
astonishing multi-million dollar facilities are any nationally ranked recruit’s 
dream. It is clear to him that Rutgers University just will not be able to live 
up to Big-Ten conference standards. Although recently introduced into the 
Big-Ten, one of the power-five conferences, Rutgers will not receive full 
conference revenue share until the 2020-2021 season and they won’t be able 
to afford to upgrade the playing facilities during his playing career.
1
  
                                                 
1
 Kevin McGuire, Rutgers has Massive Athletics Facility Upgrades Planned, Including 
Football Stadium, NBC Sports (Jun. 19, 2015, 10:32 AM), 
http://collegefootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2015/06/19/rutgers-has-massive-athletics-facility-
upgrades-planned-including-football-stadium/. 
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Growing up attending games at High Point Solutions Stadium, Rutgers’ 
home-field, the young recruit realizes his legacy is slipping away as an 
unrealistic option for the sought-after player he has grown up to be.  
In the last sixty years, professional sports have evolved into a multi-
billion-dollar industry.
2
  Collegiate athletics closely match their professional 
counterparts in total fan base and revenue.  In many ways universities are 
forced to compete with professional sports.
3
  Television rights are, by far, 
the largest component of revenues for major professional and college 
sports.
4
  Today, universities are in direct competition with professional 
sports for television air-time.  The current bounds that exist in exerting fan-
ship for a college sport team parallel those that surrounded professional 
sports in the pre-Sports Broadcasting Act era.
5
  The larger market teams 
breed the most attention and generate the most revenue.  This allows those 
big market schools to maintain their facilities and offer luxuries to players, 
enticing the best talent; while smaller market schools are left out of this 
                                                 
2
 Cork Gaines, The NFL Makes $6 Billion Annually Just from National Television 
Contracts, (Sept. 11, 2015, 4:36 PM), http:// www.businessinsider.com/chart-national-tv-
contracts-nfl-mlb-nba-nhl-2014-9.   
3
 Mark Tracy & Tim Rohan, What Made College Football More Like the Pros? $7.3 
Billion, for a Start, (Dec. 30. 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/31/sports/ncaafootball/what-made-college-ball-more-
like-the-pros-73-billion-for-a-start.html?_r=0.  
4
 Gaines, supra note 2.   
5
 See Matthew J. Mitten & Aaron Hernandez, The Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961: A 
Comparative Analysis of its Effects on Competitive Balance in the NFL and NCAA Division 
I FBS Football, 39 Ohio N. U. L. Rev. 745, 762-63 (2014) (discussing the professional 
sport competitive imbalance in Professional Sport before the enactment of the Sports 
Broadcasting Act).  
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cycle and continue to suffer in generating revenues, leaving them unable to 
offer state of the art facilities to the nation’s most desirable players.  This 
cyclic performance creates a competitive imbalance within the National 
Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”).  The National  Football League 
(“NFL”), along with other professional sports, are able to pool broadcasting 
rights pursuant to the Sports Broadcasting Act.
6
  The results of on-field 
competitions at the university level have become predictable and 
championships and bowl appearances are not distributed among the 
majority of teams, exhibiting the lack of competitive balance in collegiate 
athletics.
7
  A comparison of the AP Top 25 final college football season 
rankings and national championships with NFL clubs’ playoff appearances 
and Super Bowl championships during the same period shows there is 
currently significantly less competitive balance among universities than 
among NFL teams.
8
  Because professional sport leagues such as the NFL 
and Major League Baseball (MLB) are able to pool their broadcasting rights 
of member teams together, college sports teams are left as a competitive 
disadvantage in the market of live sporting entertainment.  Universities 
                                                 
6
 15 U.S.C. §§1291-1295 (2006) (codifying the antitrust exemption in sport, even 
though antitrust exemption had been enjoyed; major NCAA conferences have been able to 
pool their telecast rights without such statutory benefit, however threat of litigation still 
exists).  
7
 Mitten & Hernandez, supra, note 5, at 762-63. 
8
 Id. (displaying an exhibit showing the season rankings of teams from 1985 through 
2012. Data shows that 100% of the NFL’s member teams held records qualifying for the 
playoffs from 1985-2012; whereas, only 69% of Division I FBS teams finished in the AP 
Top 25 Poll even once).  
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must sell their rights as individual entities or within their respective 
conference,
9
 if they are fortunate enough to hold membership within a 
powerful conference.
10
  College teams are forced to fight against one 
another for broadcasting rights, rather than compete against the true market 
competition, other forms of live entertainment.  
Very few pieces of legislation are aimed at protecting the special 
interest of sport.
11
  However, the federal district court ruling in an antitrust 
suit brought by United States Department of Justice against the NFL 
resulted in the Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961 (“SBA”).12  The Act 
permits only professional sport leagues to collectively and exclusively sell 
all of their teams’ television rights.13  The Sports Broadcasting Act does 
not, however, protect the NCAA from antitrust scrutiny.
14
  This gap in the 
Sports Broadcasting Act bars the NCAA from collectively selling the 
television rights of universities due to the increasing threat of antitrust 
                                                 
 
9
 See infra Part IV.  
10
 The “Power-Five” conferences include the Atlantic Coast Conference (ACC), Big 
Ten Conference, Big 12 Conference, Pacific-12 Conference (Pac-12), and Southeastern 
Conference (SEC).  
11
 Mitten & Hernandez, supra, note 5, at 745 n.1 (describing the few sport-specific 
federal statutes; for example, the Ted Stevens Olympic and Amateur Sports Act, 36 U.S.C. 
§220501, et seq.; Sports Agent Responsibility Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§7801 et. seq.; Sports 
Broadcasting Act of 1961, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1291 et seq.; Equity in Athletics Disclosure Act, 20 
U.S.C. § 1092; Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (“PASPA”), 28 U.S.C. § 
3701 et seq.; The Bribery in Sporting Contests Act, 18 U.S.C § 224; Professional Boxing 
Safety Act of 1996, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6301 et seq.; Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 6307(a)-(h); and The Curt Flood Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. § 26(b)). 
12
 United States v. Nat’l Football League, 116 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Pa. 1953).  
13
 15 U.S.C. § 1291.  
14
 Id.  
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litigation.
15
   
This Note will begin by exploring the history and evolution of antitrust 
law surrounding sport including the limited application of the Sports 
Broadcasting Act.
16
  An introduction of the Sports Broadcasting Act and a 
discussion of the portions of the act that are in need of more inclusive 
language will follow.
17
  This Note will then examine the current 
competitive imbalance in collegiate athletics and emphasize the Supreme 
Court’s recognition as to the importance of maintaining competitiveness in 
the NCAA.
18
   Finally, the expansion of Sports Broadcasting Act through 
explicit regulation to immunize the NCAA, as one league with a single 
unity of interest, will be articulated as the solution to the competitive 
imbalance in college sports and the sports industry.
19
  
A.  Antitrust Overview 
Antitrust law, at its most rudimentary level, is designed to protect 
consumers.
20
  This area of the law works to field economic competition 
across all private industries by responding to anticompetitive conduct once 
                                                 
15
 See generally Nat’l Collegiate Athletics Ass’n v. Bd. Of Regents of the Univ. of 
Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85 (1984) (where the NCAA’s collective and exclusive sale of college 
football television rights were invalidated).  
16
 See infra Part II.  
17
 See infra Part III.  
18
 See infra Part IV.  
19
 See infra Part V.  
20
 See John B. Kirkwood & Robert H. Lande, The Fundamental Goal of Antitrust: 
Protecting Consumers, Not Increasing Efficiency, 84 Notre Dame L Rev. 191 (2008), 
http:// ssrn.com/abstract=1113927.  
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it occurs.
21
  With its creation in 1890, the Sherman Act
22
 formed the basis 
for most antitrust litigation pursued by the Department of Justice.  The Act 
in its original form simply prohibited any restraint of trade in order to 
“preserv[e] free . . . competition . . . .”23  Although the Sherman Act, in 
plain terms, applies only to commercial transaction, the Court has held the 
statute was intended to encompass a very wide range of restrictive conduct 
in the free market.
24
  Specifically, Section One of the Sherman Act provides 
“[e]very contract, combination . . . , or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or 
commerce . . . , is declared to be illegal.”25  This section of the Sherman Act 
is eminently over-broad in its application.
26
  It can be said every contract 
would be considered a restraint of open trade of some kind.  In 1911, the 
Supreme Court developed an updated standard for Section One of the 
Sherman Act.  This reconsideration required an act to be an “unreasonable” 
restraint on trade to be considered a violation of Section One.
27
  The 
narrowing of Section One both encourages the creation of deal contracts in 
                                                 
21
 See John B. Kirkwood & Robert H. Lande, The Fundamental Goal of Antitrust: 
Protecting Consumers, Not Increasing Efficiency, 84 Notre Dame L Rev. 191 (2008), 
http:// ssrn.com/abstract=1113927. 
22
 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2006).  
23
 N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958) (articulating the purpose of 
the Sherman Act).  
24
 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (2006); Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 787-88 
(1975) (describing Congress’ intention of Section One of the Sherman Act to strike 
broadly).  
25
 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).  
26
 See generally Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911) (the Court’s 
refusal to accept the government’s argument that Section One of the Sherman Act 
embraces every contract in restraint of trade). 
27
 Id.  
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a free market while also “prevent[ing] competitors from combining their 
economic power in ways that unduly impair competition or harm 
consumers, be it in terms of increased prices, diminished quality, limited 
choices, or impaired technological progress.”28  
A well-established Section One, Sherman Act defense to antitrust 
claims brought against members of a single entity arises out of the Supreme 
Court decision of Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp..
29
  The 
Court based this ruling on the fact that a parent-subsidiary relationship did 
not yield the anti-competitive risks the Sherman Act was enacted to 
combat.
30
  The Court concluded a corporation cannot form a combination or 
conspiracy in violation of Section One of the Sherman Act with its 
subsidiary.
31
  With the understanding that a corporation and its subsidiaries 
have a “complete unity of interest,” the Court established affiliated entities 
serving the single economic interest of the parent corporation are like a 
single entity and cannot unlawfully conspire or combine together in an 
antitrust violation.
32
   
Recently, a landmark case was decided by the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit regarding the ability of teams in the NFL to 
                                                 
28
 Michael A. McCann, American Needle v. NFL: An Opportunity to Reshape Sports 
Law, 119 Yale L.J. 726, 735-36 (2010).  
29
 Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 466 U.S. 752 (1984).  
30
 Independence Tube Corp., 466 U.S. at 772. 
31
 Id. at 773.  
32
 Copperweld Corp., 466 U.S at 771.  
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conspire for purposes of violating Section One of the Sherman Act in 
American Needle v. NFL.
33
  Following law established by the Supreme 
Court in Copperweld, a parent corporation like the NFL, and its wholly 
owned subsidiaries area single entity for antitrust purposes.  The plaintiffs 
had argued because the individual NFL teams separately owned and 
operated their team logos and trademarks, their collective agreement to 
authorize a licensor the rights to the exclusive headwear of the NFL was a 
violation of antitrust laws.
34
  The Court however found the NFL teams were 
a single entity for purposes of antitrust laws, and thus could not have 
conspired to restrict trade as competitors.
35
  The final judgment, in allowing 
the NFL teams to collectively authorize a licensor the rights to NFL 
exclusive headwear would not deprive the marketplace of the independent 
sources of economic control that competition assumes.
36
  Agreements, such 
as the one disputed in American Needle encourage cooperation within the 
league so the NFL can compete against other entertainment providers.  
Contemporary sport, as a business, has appeared at the forefront of 
                                                 
33
 American Needle v. Nat’l Football League, 538 F. 3d 736 (7th Cir. 2008).  
34
  Id.  
35
 Id. (the Court expresses skepticism to applying a definitive single-entity 
determination for all sports leagues, and states that the question of whether a sports league 
is a single entity should be addressed one league at a time as well as in one facet of a 
league at a time).   
36
 Id. (the Zen riddle of “who wins when a football team plays itself?” showing that 
although there are many competing interests, there is only one source of economic power 
which controls the promotion of football, creating a complete unity of interest. The 
licensing agreement shows cooperation).   
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antitrust litigation.
37
  Early on, the Supreme Court recognized sport to be a 
muddled area of antitrust law.  A Supreme Court ruling in 1922 specifically 
provided for a blanket antitrust exemption for Major League Baseball.
38
  In 
Federal Baseball Club, the Federal League declared itself to be a third 
major league in competition with the National and American Leagues and 
filed an antitrust lawsuit against the existing leagues.
39
  The Federal League 
asserted the National Leagues of Professional Baseball Clubs has conspired 
to monopolize the baseball business after the established leagues bought out 
owners with competing clubs in major league cities.
40
  For the first time in 
judicial history, the Supreme Court distinguished baseball as a sport from 
other business structures and provided for an antitrust exemption for the 
major baseball leagues.
41
  As a result of Federal Baseball Club, sport 
generally had been deemed to not fall within the restraints of the antitrust 
                                                 
37
 Fed. Baseball Club of Balt., Inc. v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 
200 (1922).  
38
 Id.; Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 285 (1972) (the Court affirms Major League 
Baseball’s antitrust exemption, finding that “Congress has no intention of including the 
business of baseball within the scope of federal antitrust laws”); Toolson v. New York 
Yankees, 346 U.S. 356 (1953) (upholding Major League Baseball’s antitrust exemption 
where frequent travel across state lines is deemed to be merely incidental to the baseball 
competitions. The sporting competitions are not deemed to be commerce, and thus, is 
purely a state affair. Due to the interstate nature of sport, the Supreme Court continuously 
finds that the business is not subject to federal antitrust law).     
39
 Fed. Baseball Club of Balt., Inc., 259 U.S. 200.  
40
 Fed. Baseball Club of Balt., Inc., 259 U.S. at 200.   
41
 Id. (affirming the ruling of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals National 
League of Professional Baseball Clubs v. Fed. Baseball Club of Balt., 50 App. D.C. 165, 
269 (1920) (finding that baseball as a sport was not trade because it was “spontaneous 
output of human activity . . . not in its nature commerce.”) (The court also finds that the 
sport of baseball “affects no exchange of things.”); Roger I. Abrams, Legal Bases: Baseball 
and the Law 56 (1998) (legal counsel in the case of Federal Baseball argues before the 
Supreme Court that “the very existence of baseball depend[s] upon its exemption from 
antitrust laws.”)).  
2017] EXPANDING THE SPORTS BROADCASTING ACT 103 
 
acts under a blanket exemption.
42
  Thirty years later, the Court upheld 
baseball’s antitrust exemption in Toolson v. New York Yankees.43  In a one 
paragraph per curium, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the ruling of Federal 
Baseball.
44
  This judicially produced antitrust exemption for sport generally 
was first challenged in the 1950s.  The 1955 Supreme Court decision of 
International Boxing Club reversed the antitrust exemptions enjoyed 
generally by sport in previous years through the blanket exemptions 
achieved in the previous baseball rulings.
45
  The federal government’s 
assertion the International Boxing Club has committed antitrust violations 
through a conspiracy to exclude competition in the boxing promotion 
market was accepted by the Supreme Court.
46
  The Court found the boxing 
business as well as sport generally, to fall within the scope of the Sherman 
Act.
47
  International Boxing Club was the first instance in which a 
professional sporting agency, outside of baseball, has argued it should be 
covered by the same blanket exemption afforded to professional baseball.
48
  
The district court in Boxing Club had initially dismissed the antitrust suit 
                                                 
42
 Fed. Baseball Club of Balt., Inc., 259 U.S. at 200; Roger I. Abrams, Legal Bases: 
Baseball and the Law 56 (1998). 
43
 Toolson v. New York Yankees, 346 U.S. 356 (1953) (where a minor league baseball 
player asserts that his reassignment to another club team is a violation of antitrust law).  
44
 Id. (finding that “[t]he business [of baseball] has . . . been left for thirty years to 
develop, on the understanding that it was not subject to existing antitrust legislation.”). 
45
 United States v. International Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236 (1955) (overruling 
previous decision providing for an exemption for NLB (Fed. Baseball Club v. Nat’l 
League, 259 U.S. 2000 (1922)).  
46
 United States, 348 U.S. at 236.  
47
 Id.  
48
 Id.  
104 PACE INTELL. PROP. SPORTS & ENT. L. F. [Vol. 7:1 
 
brought by the government on the Supreme Court’s presiding authority of 
Federal Baseball Club; however, the Supreme Court found the previous 
rulings of Federal Baseball Club and Toolson to be narrowly limited to the 
business of baseball.
49
  The Supreme Court found the boxing business, 
although a sport, subject to antitrust litigation, despite its parallel structure 
to the exempted professional baseball league.
50
  The Court noted 
professional boxing shared the “live presentation of local exhibition” 
characteristics of baseball; yet, no judicially created exemption existed.
51
  
This discrepancy in the courts’ application of antitrust law to sport, marked 
the beginning of an ambiguous area of antitrust law, making the dealings of 
sport business amongst competitors unclear.  Although “[t]he business [of 
sport] ha[d] . . . been left . . . to develop, on the understanding that is was 
not subject to existing antitrust legislation,” the Court has made the legal 
effects of regulatory practices within the industry unpredictable.
52
 
B.  The Sports Broadcasting Act 
Sport has a very unique business structure, as applied to antitrust law.  
Each sporting team is competing against other teams within a single league 
through on-field competition; however, the goal of one team is not to run 
another team out of business.  The teams of one particular league are not in 
free-market competition with each other.  The benefits of on-field 
                                                 
49
 United States, 348 U.S. at 236. 
50
 Id. 
51
 Id.  
52
 Quoting, Toolson, 346 U.S. 356.  
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competition are shared throughout any given league, which is in 
competition with other forms of live-entertainment.  Each league forms a 
“unity of interest”53 across all the member teams.  It is essential to the 
existence of each member team of the National Football League that on-
field competition exists to protect the league’s interest of preserving the 
sport of professional football.  It would not be accurate to say the Dallas 
Cowboys are in open-market competition with the Green Bay Packers even 
though they meet in the form of on-field competition, because they reside 
under the umbrella of the national professional league.  The National 
Football League however, should be considered to be in open-market 
competition with the National Hockey League or Major League Baseball; 
they are completely separate entities, with their own interest of furthering 
their given sport.  Additionally, each member team of the National Football 
League must do more than merely exist, the playing field must be 
comparatively even so the product created by a league will promote 
viewership and compete with other entertainment sources.  If the New 
England Patriots win the Super Bowl World Championship in an obvious 
and predicted victory year after year, the entire professional football league 
would suffer as a result.  Fans would begin to lose interest and total revenue 
would be diminished.  Relatedly, the competitors in the market of leisure 
                                                 
53
 McCann, supra note 28.  
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activities and live entertainment would benefit from the turmoil of 
professional football, as the major competitors to the NFL.  More directly, 
other sport leagues would immediately realize the benefit of a loss of 
interest in the professional football league through increased viewership and 
revenue.  
Professional sporting leagues, along with Congress have discovered 
leagues succeed when the on-field competition among teams is more 
balanced.
54
  Often times, ensuring this desired result of even competition 
requires an equal distribution of revenue among the teams in the league.
55
  
Because of the Sherman Act’s explicit prohibition against collusion among 
competitors that unreasonably restrains trade, agreements amongst teams to 
share revenue often raises antitrust concerns with the Department of Justice 
and major competitors.
56
  Specifically, Section One of the Sherman Act has 
plagued the NFL in recent years.
57
 
1. United States v. National Football League, 1953 (NFL I) 
     In the early 1950s, each NFL team contracted individually with local 
                                                 
54
 McCann, supra note 28 at 732 (citing to David Harris, Pete Rozelle: The Man Who 
Made Football an American Obsession, N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1984, § 6 (Magazine), at 12) 
(arguing that the key to marketing professional football is maintaining a consistently high 
level of competition among all of the member teams, a goal that could be reached by 
limiting the competition off the field.  By forcing each franchise to work for itself 
financially a division into rich and poor teams would inevitably provide enormous 
advantages to few teams.  In creating a corresponding imbalance on the field, the 
attractiveness of the league as a whole is greatly diminished).    
55
 Id.  
56
 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).  
57
 McCann, supra note 28 at 732.  
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television stations to broadcast their games.
58
 Out of fear the smaller market 
teams may face eventual bankruptcy, the NFL prohibited the teams from 
broadcasting games into the market of another team unless permission was 
granted by the home team in order to regulate the member teams 
financially.
59
 The NFL believed this regulation would enhance the 
popularity of the league.
60
 Subsequently, the United States Department of 
Justice filed an antitrust suit against the NFL in 1953 (“NFL I”), alleging 
violations of the Sherman Act.
61
 The government alleged the provision in 
the NFL bylaws restricting where teams telecast their games had 
unreasonable restrained trade in the market for broadcasting in the NFL in 
violation of Section One of the Sherman Act.
62
 The federal district court 
determined this bylaw constituted an unreasonable restriction placed among 
NFL teams affected interstate trade, making it subject to judicial scrutiny.
63
 
The court characterized the NFL’s restriction on broadcasting to be “a clear 
case of allocating marketing territories among competitors, which is a 
practice generally held illegal under the anti-trust laws;” however, the court 
also recognized the NFL to be “a unique type of business.”64  
                                                 
58United States v. Nat’l Football League (NFL I), 116 F. Supp. 319, 321 (E.D. Pa. 
1953), superseded by statute, Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-331, 75 
Stat. 732.  
59
 United States, 116 F. Supp. at 321. 
60
 Id.  
61
 Id. at 326.  
62
 Id.  
63
 Id.  
64
 United States, 116 F. Supp. at 326-27. 
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     The court explained: 
Professional teams in a league, however, must not 
compete too well with each other in a business way. 
On the playing field, of course, they must compete as 
hard as they can all the time. But it is not necessary 
and indeed it is unwise for all the teams to compete 
as hard as they can against each other . . . . If all the 
teams should compete as hard as they can in a 
business way, the stronger teams would be likely to 
drive the weaker ones into financial failure. If this 
should happen not only would the weaker teams fail, 
but eventually the whole league, both the weaker and 
the stronger teams, would fail, because without a 
league no team can operate profitably. 
It is particularly true in the National Football 
League that the teams should not compete too 
strongly with each other in a business way . . . .  
 
. . . it is both wise and essential that rules be 
passed to help the weaker clubs in their competition 
with the stronger ones and to keep the League in 
fairly even balance . . . . 
 
. . . the net effects of allowing unrestricted 
business competition among the clubs are likely to 
be, first, the creation of greater and greater 
inequalities in the strength of the teams; second, the 
weaker teams being driven out of business; and, 
third, the destruction of the entire League.
65
 
 
     The restriction on broadcasting within another team’s home territory 
was deemed a reasonable restriction with the procompetitive effect of 
preserving the individual teams as well as the league itself.
66
 However, the 
court found the restriction to be unreasonable in the event of a team’s away 
                                                 
65
 United States, 116 F. Supp. at 326-27. 
66
 Id. at 326.  
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game.
67
 The NFL was enjoined from restricting the sale of television 
rights.
68
 
2. United States v. National Football, 1961 (NFL II) 
 
          Despite the restrictions on the league imposed by the court in NFL 
I, the NFL grew in popularity following the court’s ruling. The NFL 
continued to anticipate teams in larger television markets would be far more 
profitable than the weaker, smaller market teams, which would destroy the 
competitive balance of the league.
69
 In 1961, television revenues had 
skyrocketed from a previous $1,239,000 in 1953, to a staggering $3,510,000 
following the execution of a telecast agreement with a major broadcasting 
company.
70
 The NFL gave the telecaster the exclusive right to broadcast all 
NFL regular season games.
71
 This was the first time the NFL collectively 
sold its member teams’ television rights.72 Due to the unclear nature of the 
ruling of NFL I, the NFL petitioned the court for an interpretation of the 
final judgment resolving the 1953 antitrust litigation to determine whether 
the previous ruling barred the exclusive broadcasting agreement.
73
  In 1961, 
the same federal district court of NFL I prohibited the NFL from 
                                                 
67
 United States, 116 F. Supp. at 326. 
68
 Id. 
69
 U.S. Football League v. Nat’l Football League, 842 F.2d 1335, 1346 (2d Cir. 1988). 
70
 Mitten & Hernandez, supra, note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 749-50 (citing 
ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Federal Statutory Exemptions From Antitrust Law at 219 
(2007)).  
71
 U.S. Football League, 842 F.2d at 1346.  
72
 Id. 
73
 I U.S. Football League, 842 F.2d at 1346. 
110 PACE INTELL. PROP. SPORTS & ENT. L. F. [Vol. 7:1 
 
collectively selling the television rights of the member teams to the major 
broadcaster (“NFL II”).74 The court found the agreement worked to 
eliminate economic competition among the individual NFL teams because it 
allowed the broadcaster to determine which games would be telecast in 
which areas
75
 and violated the previous injunction prohibiting them from 
agreeing to restrict the geographical areas the games would be broadcasted 
except within a team’s home territory during a home game.76  The Court’s 
ruling banned the execution and performance of the contract with the 
broadcasting company.
77
  The pooling of rights by all of the teams to 
achieve an exclusive contract between the NFL and the broadcasting entity 
was deemed illegal.
78
  The league had also been enjoined from collecting 
revenue and distributing it across the league through revenue sharing.
79
  
This ruling imposed risk of diminishing the on-field competition within the 
NFL and threatened to financially weaken the younger teams as well as 
teams located in smaller markets without a huge fan-base.  These threats, 
recognized by the court in NFL I were now glaring the professional football 
league in the face, with the ruling of NFL II. 
               In a swift, 60-day response to the court’s rulings in NFL I  and 
                                                 
74
 United States v. Nat’l Football League (NFL II), 196 F. Supp. 445, 446 (E.D. Pa. 
1961).   
75
 Id.  
76
 United States 196 F. Supp. at 447.   
77
 Id. at 446.   
78
 Id.   
79
 Id.   
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NFL II, the Sports Broadcasting Act
80
 was enacted.
81
 The Sports 
Broadcasting Act overruled the federal district court’s decisions and 
permitted joint broadcasting agreements among the major professional 
sports.
82
  The Act called for an exemption for the collective sale of 
broadcasting rights by professional sports from antitrust challenges.
83
 The 
Act provides for a limited antitrust exemption, narrowly construing the 
blanket rule afforded to professional baseball in Federal Baseball.
84
  The 
Sports Broadcasting Act states that antitrust law: 
shall not apply to any joint agreement by or 
among persons engaging in or conducting the 
organized professional team sports . . . by which any 
league of clubs participating in professional 
[sporting] contests sells or otherwise transfers all or 
any part of the rights of such league’s member clubs 
in the sponsored telecasting of the games of 
[professional sports], as the case may be, engaged in 
or conducted by such clubs.
85
 
 
     In essence, the Act enables member teams of a professional sports 
league to pool their separate rights to broadcast their games and to share the 
revenue from the pooled sale of those rights, without threat of antitrust 
litigation. The Act provides for antitrust exemption for the professional 
                                                 
80
 15 U.S.C. §§ 1291-1295 (2006) (titled “Telecasting of Professional Sports 
Contest”). 
81
 Lacie L. Kaiser, Revisiting the Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961: A Call for 
Equitable Antitrust Immunity from Section One of the Sherman Act for All Professional 
Sports Leagues, 54 DePaul L. Rev. 1237, 1245 (2005). 
82
 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006). 
83
 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006). 
84
 Fed. Baseball Club of Balt., Inc., 259 U.S. 200. 
85
 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006). 
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sports of: football, baseball, basketball, and hockey; however, the act fails 
to provide an exemption for televised collegiate athletics.
86
  
     The Sports Broadcasting Act was principled on the concept of free 
market trade regulation in sport.
87
  The purpose of the Act was to “enable 
the member clubs . . . to pool their separate rights in the sponsored 
broadcasting of their games and to permit the league to sell the resulting 
package of pooled rights to a purchaser . . . without violating the antitrust 
laws.”88 Although they act as competitors, in a business sense, the teams are 
interdependent partners, whose success as enterprises is intertwined. 
Although not required by the Sports Broadcasting Act, collective pooling of 
broadcasting rights has allowed for the revenues to be shared across all 
teams and has equalized the widely disparate value of each team’s 
television contract.  As recognized early on by the federal district court in 
NFL I, maintaining a competitive balance between the teams is necessary 
for any of them to remain viable enterprises.
89
 As a result of this unique 
revenue sharing opportunity afforded by the Act, the competitive balance 
among teams in the NFL was unprecedented until other major professional 
sports leagues including Major League Baseball, the National Basketball 
Association, and the National Hockey League accepted the revenue sharing 
                                                 
86
 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006). 
87
 S. Rep. No 1087, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 3042 (1961). 
88
 S. Rep. No 1087, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 3042 (1961). 
89
 United States v. Nat’l Football League (NFL I), at 321. 
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model.  
     The rest of the provisions of the Sports Broadcasting Act work to 
both expand and limit the television power of professional sports. Section 
1293 states the antitrust immunity provided by the Sports Broadcasting Act 
does not apply to the broadcast of professional football games on Fridays 
and Saturdays.
90
  This section of the Act helps to protect the telecast of 
college football games from having to compete against professional football 
games.
91
  This provision was designed to protect college football from the 
potentially devastating effects of competing for crowds against televised 
professional games. Although Section 1293 does not directly prohibit a 
Friday or Saturday professional broadcast, the danger of losing the antitrust 
immunity is enough to keep the professional football league from 
broadcasting at the stipulated college broadcasts times. Section 1294 of the 
Act clarifies that the antitrust immunity granted by the Act only applies to 
collective broadcast agreements made by professional sports leagues and 
not any other “act, contract, agreement, rule, course of conduct, or other 
activity.
92
 
C.  NCAA Does Not Receive Basic Antitrust Exemption  
 
          A conspicuous gap in the provisions of the Sports Broadcasting 
Act lies in the realm of college sport. As a huge competitor in the live sport 
                                                 
90
 15 U.S.C. § 1293, supra note 86.  
91
 U.S. Football League, 842 F.2d at 1347.  
92
 15 U.S.C. § 1294.  
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entertainment industry, it does not receive the same immunities afforded to 
professional sporting leagues. The NCAA was founded in 1905 by the 
presidents of sixty-two colleges and universities in order to create a set of 
uniform rules to regulate intercollegiate football.  Today, over one-thousand 
athletic institutions are regulated by the NCAA.  Based on the quantity and 
quality of the athletic programs at a university, the athletic departments are 
organized into three divisions: Division I, Division II, and Division III. 
Division I schools provide the greatest number and highest quality of 
opportunities to student athletes. At the Division I level, universities are 
constantly recruiting athletes to play with their athletic departments. For 
2011-12, the most recent year for which audited numbers are available, 
NCAA total revenue was $871.6 million.
93
 81% percent of this revenue 
came from television and marketing rights fees in an agreement for 
exclusive broadcast rights of the NCAA men’s basketball championship 
with Turner/CBS Sports.
94
  96% is distributed directly to the Division I 
membership.
95
  The television rights to intercollegiate football have been 
controlled by the NCAA since 1951.
96
  
     The NCAA is the dominant force in the presentation and regulation 
                                                 
93
 NCAA Revenue Breakdown, http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/finances/revenue 
(last visited Dec. 15, 2015). 
94
 Id.; CBS Sports, Turner Broadcasting, NCAA Reach 14-Year Agreement (Jan. 12, 
2011), http://www.ncaa.com/news/basketball-men/2010-04-21/cbs-sports-turner-
broadcasting-ncaa-reach-14-year-agreement. 
95
 NCAA Revenue, supra, note 93. 
96
 NCAA v. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. at 2955.  
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of intercollegiate athletics. The NCAA Division I Manual contains 
numerous provisions designed to prevent universities from bribing 
prospective student-athletes too early. The NCAA regulates the timing of 
official visits and scholarship offers; however, these regulations do not put 
university athletic departments on a level playing field.  Such large market 
power has brought on much federal antitrust litigation.
97
  In less than forty 
years, the NCAA has had thirty-one cases filed against it.  Of those thirty-
one claims against the NCAA, courts have overwhelmingly held in setting 
and regulating eligibility standards, the NCAA is acting “outside the scope” 
of antitrust law and is therefore not subject to antitrust review.
98
  However, 
the courts are split when the NCAA balances universities’ receipt of telecast 
revenues by regulating the output of televised football games; meanwhile 
college sports conferences are less assignable than the NCAA.
99
  College 
sports conferences, as organized by the universities themselves, share the 
uniform interest of attracting attention and increasing broadcast revenues in 
                                                 
97
 See e.g., NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85 
(1985); Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir. 1998); Smith v. NCAA, 139 F.3d 180 (3d 
Cir 1998); Banks v. NCAA, 977 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1992); McCormack v. NCAA, 845 
F.2d 1338 (5th Cir. 1988); Pocono Invitational Sports Camp, Inc. v. NCAA, 317 F. Supp. 
2d 569 (E.D. Pa. 2004); Gaines v. NCAA, 746 F. Supp. 738 (M.D. Tenn. 1990); Jones v. 
NCAA, 392 F. Supp., 295 (D. Mass. 1975).  
98
 See Bassett v. NCAA, 528 F.3d 426, 433 (6th Cir. 2008) (holding NCAA’s 
recruitment provisions not commercial and therefore outside reach of antitrust); Bowers v. 
NCAA, 9 F. Supp. 2d 460, 497 (D.N.J. 1998) (stating the “Sherman Act does not apply to 
the NCAA’s promulgation of eligibility requirements.”); Gaines v. NCAA, 746 F. Supp. 
738, 744 (M.D. Tenn. 1990) (holding NCAA eligibility rules not subject to antitrust 
analysis).  
99
 See e.g. Bd. Of Regents, 468 U.S. 85.  
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striking telecast deals with major broadcasters.
100
  Courts have concluded 
that restrictions imposed by the NCAA have promoted a much needed 
competitive balance within college sport; while other Courts have been 
unable to justify NCAA restraints on telecasts and have concluded the 
Sherman Act is violated in regulated broadcast situations. In determining 
whether the NCAA serves a unity of interest under an American Needle 
analysis, the independent centers of decision-making must come together in 
support of a core activity.
101
 
1. NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma 
 
     The Supreme Court has previously found the core activity of schools 
that participate under the NCAA umbrella is the production of education, 
not the production of college sporting events.
102
 In the early 1950s, a study 
had been conducted indicating that television had an adverse effect on 
college football game attendance.
103
 Subsequently, the NCAA came up with 
a broadcasting scheme that allowed one game per week to be broadcast in 
each area and limited each university to two television appearances per 
season.
104
 The NCAA entered into agreements according to the 
broadcasting restrictions with ABC, CBS, and TBS, allowing each network 
                                                 
100
 See e.g. Bd. Of Regents, 468 U.S. 85. 
101
 Am. Needle, Inc., 560 U.S. at 190.  
102
 NCAA, 468 U.S. at 121-22.  
103
 Id. at 90. 
104
 Id. 
2017] EXPANDING THE SPORTS BROADCASTING ACT 117 
 
to broadcast a limited number of games per season.
105
 These agreements 
expressly barred all universities from selling its own team’s broadcast 
rights.
106
 However, the University of Oklahoma and the University of 
Georgia entered into an agreement with NBC for more than the allotted 
television appearances, and for more money than the NCAA agreements.
107
  
The universities sought an injunction against the NCAA from interfering 
with their NBC agreement.
108
 In 1984, the Supreme Court found the NCAA 
was in violation of the Sherman Act because the NCAA’s actions were a 
horizontal restraint in trade which limited the Universities’ freedom to 
negotiate.
109
 Such a restraint placed by the NCAA on universities, limiting 
the number of games to be televised, created a limit on the quantity of 
televised football to be available to broadcasters and fans.
110
 It had been 
well settled that limitations on output are frowned upon by antitrust laws; 
thus the NCAA was deemed to have solely controlled televised football and 
held a monopoly.
111
 The court noted that the NCAA’s actions were not per 
se illegal because the NCAA, through their actions, fostered competition in 
other sports, but not for televised football.
112
 The court stated: 
What the NCAA and its member institutions 
                                                 
105
 NCAA, 468 U.S. at 90. 
106
 Id. 
107
 Id. at 95. 
108
 Id. 
109
 Id. at 99. 
110
 Id. 
111
 Id. at 112. 
112
 Id. at 101. 
118 PACE INTELL. PROP. SPORTS & ENT. L. F. [Vol. 7:1 
 
market in this case is competition itself -- contests 
between competing institutions. Of course, this 
would be completely ineffective if there were no 
rules on which the competitors agreed to create and 
define the competition to be marketed. A myriad of 
rules affecting such matters as the size of the field, 
the number of players on a team, and the extent to 
which physical violence is encouraged or proscribed, 
all must be agreed upon, and all restrain the manner 
in which institutions compete. . . . In order to 
preserve the character and quality of the "product," 
athletes must not be paid, must be required to attend 
class, and the like. And the integrity of the "product" 
cannot be preserved except by mutual agreement; if 
an institution adopted such restrictions unilaterally, 
its effectiveness as a competitor on the playing field 
might soon be destroyed. Thus, the NCAA plays a 
vital role in enabling college football to preserve its 
character, and as a result enables a product to be 
marketed which might otherwise be unavailable. In 
performing this role, its actions widen consumer 
choice -- not only the choices available to sports fans 
but also those available to athletes -- and hence can 
be viewed as procompetitive.
113
 
 
Even so, the court made a final determination that the focus of the 
NCAA was to market the product of college football.
114
  
     In his dissent, Justice White noted the NCAA had further preserved 
the associations goal of promoting amateur college athletics by spreading 
revenues among multiple universities.
115
 The NCAA had ensured the 
economic viability of athletic programs and promoted competitive college 
                                                 
113
 NCAA, 468 U.S. at 101-02. 
114
 Id. at 112. 
115
 NCAA, 468 U.S. at 124.  
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football.
116
 White balanced these contributions against the minimal 
anticompetitive effects of the NCAA’s restrictions and found the overall 
preservation of the association as a whole to far outweigh any antitrust 
concerns created by the broadcast restrictions.
117
  
2. Rock v. NCAA 
 
     More recently, the court has noted the competitive imbalance that 
exists among Division I universities in Rock v. NCAA.
118
 In Rock, the 
plaintiffs challenged restraints imposed by the NCAA.
119
 The court 
dismissed the complaint on the grounds that the Sherman Act did not apply 
as a matter of law.
120
 The Court emphasized the importance of regulations 
enacted by the NCAA that work to preserve the character and quality of the 
association. The Court, in recognition of a lack of competitive balance, 
proposed that “[i]t [would be] implausible to suggest that lower-tier 
Division I football schools offer the same level of in-kind benefits (premier 
coaching, facilities, and national publicity).”121  
     In finding the NCAA to be imposing regulations with pro-
competitive effect, the Courts have acknowledged the necessity of NCAA 
involvement in protecting the unity of interest of the member universities, 
                                                 
116
 NCAA, 468 U.S. at 136.  
117
 Id. at 135.  
118
 Rock v. NCAA, 928 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1021-22 (S.D. Ind. 2013) (dismissing with 
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119
 Id. at 1014.  
120
 Id. 
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 NCAA, 928 F. Supp. 2d at 1021-22. 
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yet the NCAA has not received antitrust protection in regulating the 
broadcasting arrangements of its subsidiaries. Professional sports, as direct 
competitors to collegiate athletics, continuously reap the benefits of the 
immunity built into the Sports Broadcasting Act; while institutions are left 
to squander without similar benefits.  
D.  The NCAA is Deserving of the Same Protection  
 
     NCAA broadcast packages are not subject to the antitrust exemption 
and it has suffered as an association for it. Using the antitrust exemption 
granted under the Sports Broadcasting Act, the NFL made its first pooled-
rights contract in 1962 and 1963 for $4.65 million with an exclusive 
broadcaster.
122
 The 1964 and 1965 seasons produced a collective broadcast 
agreement for $14.1 million.
123
 The NFL’s largest competitor, the American 
Football League (“AFL”), pooled the rights of its member teams, and 
entered into a $36 million five-year agreement in 1964.
124
 When the NFL 
and AFL merged in 1966, Congress amended the Sports Broadcasting Act 
to provide antitrust immunity on the merger on the condition that the NFL 
would have broadcast contracts with at least two networks.
125
 Today, the 
NFL has four major broadcast agreements totaling over $4 billion per 
                                                 
122
 U.S. Football League, 842 F.2d at 1347.  
123
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124
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125
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year.
126
 In 2013, each NFL member team received $131 million in national 
television money; that number is expecting to increase to at least $181 
million per team by 2016.
127
 Under a “League Think” mentality, by pooling 
their resources and sharing their profits, the NFL is able to provide a 
product that, as a whole, is much more valuable than the sum of its 
individual parts.
128
  
     In its enactment of the Sports Broadcasting Act, Congress imposed a 
condition of Section 1294 eliminating antitrust immunity for professional 
football leagues if any television contract allowed the NFL to broadcast 
games “on any Friday after [6PM] or on any Saturday during the period 
beginning on the second Friday in September and ending on the second 
Saturday in December.”129 This stipulation bars the NFL from televising 
games that directly compete with college football, maintaining the integrity 
of college football as a sport. Not bound by the narrow case precedent of 
NFL II, the National Football League and the National Basketball 
Association (NBA) have continued to collectively sell their television rights 
in increasing overall revenue for their respective sports. While the NCAA is 
                                                 
126
 See, TV Money up 20 percent for NFL Clubs, SportsBusiness Daily (July 21, 2014), 
available at http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2014/07/21/Finance/NFL-
revenue.aspx (NFL had broadcast licenses with three network partners; CBS, NBC, and 
Fox, as well as ESPN and DirecTV) 
127
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128
 Clay Moorhead, Revenue Sharing and the Salary Cap in the NFL: Perfecting the 
Balance Between NFL Socialism and Unrestrained Free-Trade, 8 Vand. J. Ent. & Tech. L 
641, 642 (2005-2006).  
129
 15 U.S.C § 1294.  
122 PACE INTELL. PROP. SPORTS & ENT. L. F. [Vol. 7:1 
 
left to compete against professional sport without the same protection.     
     In 1961, the NCAA passed up the chance to apply for an exemption 
piggybacking off of the Sports Broadcasting Act under the impression their 
ties to higher education would shield its rules and regulations from antitrust 
scrutiny.
130
 In 1991, after ascertaining the benefits enjoyed by professional 
sports who were able to pool collective television rights without feared 
antitrust litigation, U.S. Representative and former professional basketball 
player, Tom McMillen introduced legislation entitled the “Collegiate 
Athletic Reform Act.”  The proposed bill granted the NCAA temporary 
antitrust exemption in exchange for NCAA reform regarding revenue 
sharing.
131
  Similarly, in 2008 congress was introduced with the “College 
Sports Leal Reform Act.”132  The proposal called for antitrust exemption for 
any NCAA commercial activity with at least one educational principal 
purpose.
133
 Andrew Zimbalist, a noted sports economist previously 
advocated a partial antitrust exemption in the NCAA, while Len Elmore, 
former NBA player and college basketball commentator has suggested the 
NCAA receive a broad antitrust exemption so it can mandate revenues be 
                                                 
130
 Daniel E. Lazaroff, An Antitrust Exemption for the NCAA: Sound Policy of Letting 
the Fox Loose in the Henhouse? 41 Issue 2 Pepperdine Law Review 229, 237 citing to, 
Brian L. Porto, The Supreme Court and the NCAA 19 (2012) Welch Suggs, Football, 
Television, and the Supreme Court, Chron. Higher Educ., July 9, 2004, at A32-A33. 
131
 Id. at 237 n.51 (where the proposed bill failed to become law).  
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 Id. at 237. 
133
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utilized to “benefit the [institutions] as a whole . . . .”134 Most recently, a 
group of professors collectively titled “The Coalition On Intercollegiate 
Athletics” crafted a five part recommendation to explore the possibility of 
an antitrust exemption for college institutions.
135
 The group recommended: 
(1) creating an exemption, (2) lessening commercialism in college sport, (3) 
advocating policies to keep big football conferences under the umbrella of 
the NCAA, (4) increasing efforts to respond to “reputational risks” derived 
from the “market driven model of sports,” and (5) cooperating with the 
NCAA to effect change.
136
 The decisions of antitrust litigation and proposed 
antitrust legislation have always remained in the spirit of competition. 
Antitrust law has historically encouraged cooperation inside a business 
organization to help it compete with those working outside of the business. 
As a general notion, if the questionable actions of the parties have the 
potential to lessen economic competition, then the activities are likely 
Sherman Antitrust Act Violations. Under modern antitrust law – and post-
Sports Broadcasting Act enactment, leagues such as the NCAA, should be 
permitted to enter into agreements based on the rationale the individual 
teams share a unity of interest, furthering the NCAA’s economic viability 
against outsiders such as, professional sports.
137
  
                                                 
134
 Lazaroff, supra note 130 at 238.  
135
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136
 Id. 
137
 Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. Pshp. v. NBA, 95 F. 3d 593 (7th Cir. 1996) (see majority 
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     The Supreme Court in NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of 
Oklahoma concluded a collective television broadcast agreement within the 
NCAA constituted horizontal price fixing, yet not illegal per se because the 
NCAA, through a collective agreement, worked to regulate college football 
where “horizontal restraints on competition [were] essential if the product 
[were] to be available at all.
138
  In spite of the Supreme Court’s ruling 
against major competition policy considerations, more college football 
games were televised; however, a survey of the economic impact of the 
Supreme Court’s decision revealed total television revenue received by the 
nation’s colleges and universities from broadcasts of college football was 
less than those received in 1983.
139
  At the University of Oklahoma for 
example, total television revenues received during the 1984-85 season were 
$753,000 as compared to the $1,000,000 received during the 1983-84 
season.
140
 As universities negotiated and signed their own contracts, the 
market became saturated. Now, institutions were forced to compete with 
each other for television coverage, while also competing with entertainment 
                                                                                                                            
and concurrence stating that although each NB team was under separate ownership and 
management the league functions as a single entity, creating a single product that competes 
with other amateur and professional sports and other entertainment choices. Justice 
Cudahy’s concurrence dives into making the determination of whether a sports league is a 
single entity. Cudahy states it is the cooperation among teams to create league basketball. It 
does not matter that each team has different and independent economic interest).  
138
 NCAA v. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. at 2960.  
139
 James S Arico, NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma: Has the 
Supreme Court Abrogated the Per Se Rule of Antitrust Analysis 19 Issue 2 Loy. L. A. L. R. 
437, 463 (1986).  
140
 Id. citing a telephone interview with Carol Barnes, University of Oklahoma 
Accounting Manager (Sept. 19, 1985).  
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sources outside of the NCAA umbrella.  
     Big schools have an obvious competitive advantage over the smaller 
schools, in terms of revenue, television exposure, recruiting, and access to 
major bowl games. During the 2012-13 season, the Big 12’s 10 schools 
shared $196 million in revenue; similarly, the SEC distributed $289.4 
million to 14 schools, and the Big Ten teams took in $308 million.
141
 
Collectively, the big five conferences collected over $1.4 billion in revenue, 
while the bottom five conferences collected a total of $175 million. This 
skewed revenue distribution results in disproportionate athletic programs 
across the nation. Television money has allowed a select few universities to 
provide state of the art facilities and amenities to college football teams and 
over the years, college sport has become a spend to win business.  Revenue 
sharing now is more important in the success of sport leagues, including the 
NCAA, than ever before. A major college belonging to one of the five 
major “Power” conferences142 who participate in revenue sharing, can earn 
$50 million
143
 per year in regular-season broadcast rights, up from about 
                                                 
141
Larry Atkins, NCAA Needs to Protect Small Conferences from Major Conferences’ 
Latest Power Grab (Mar. 17, 2014) http://www.huffingtonpost.com/larry-atkins/ncaa-
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$28 million during the 2013 season;
144
 while a strong and attractive 
independent like Boise State brings in roughly $15 million
145
 and Tulane, 
another independent team, brings in $6 million.
146
 It is argued individual 
institutions should be able to take advantage of their marketability, and 
should not be forced to carry the burden of less marketable universities.
147
 
Although a justified concern, one of the main purposes of NCAA regulation 
of college football is to preserve a competitive environment.
148
 The 
redistribution of television revenue across all Division One programs is 
pivotal in furthering the economic success of the NCAA as a league of its 
own; especially considering the current economic inequality in college 
football has reached such critical levels that the future viability of lower-
revenue schools is a serious concern.
149
 
E.  Updating the Sports Broadcasting Act to Encompass Collegiate 
Athletics  
     Congress has already recognized a competitive imbalance, like the 
                                                 
144
 Wednell Marnhouse, Big 12 Announces Record Revenue Distribution (May 30, 
2014) http://www.big12sports.com/ViewArticle.dbml?ATCLID=209513755; Mac Tracy & 
Tim Rohan, What Made College Football More Like the Pros? 7.3 Billion, for a Start 
(Dec. 30, 2014) http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/31/sports/ncaafootball/whay-made-
college-ball-more-like-the-pros-73-billion-for-a-start.html?_r=0.  
145
 Alicia Jessop, The Economics of College Football: A Look at the Top-25 Teams’ 
Revenues and Expenses (Aug. 31, 2013, 10:32 AM) 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/aliciajessop/2013/08/31/the-economics-of-college-football-a-
look-at-the-top-25-teams-revenues-and-expenses/.  
146
 Chris Smith, The Most Valuable Conferences in College Sports 2014 (Apr. 15, 
2014, 2:49 PM) http://www.forbes.com/sites/chrissmith/2014/04/15/the-most-valuable-
conferences-in-college-sports-2014/.  
147
 McCann, supra note 28.  
148
 Id.  
149
 Id.  
2017] EXPANDING THE SPORTS BROADCASTING ACT 127 
 
one that exists in NCAA, should be remedied.
150
 The legislative history of 
the Sports Broadcasting Act depicts congressional recognition that “a 
league needs the power to make package sales of the television rights of its 
member clubs to assure the weaker clubs of the league continuing television 
income and television coverage on a basis of substantial equality with the 
stronger clubs. Such income and coverage . . . often mark the difference 
between profitable and losing operations.”151   The commissioner of the 
AFL testified during the hearings, before the Antitrust Subcommittee, that 
television revenues are such a significant part of the overall financial 
success of a professional football team that it is necessary to prevent too 
great disparity in the television income of the various clubs through the 
pooling of revenues and package agreements.
152
  It can only be reasoned the 
same principals would apply for collegiate athletics as well, thus calling for 
the pooling of television rights by the NCAA.  
     The Sports Broadcasting Act, in its current effectiveness, provides 
antitrust immunity only for the collective sale of sponsored telecasting 
rights of professional sports leagues.
153
  The interest in distributing revenues 
across all teams as a means of leveling competitive balance and promoting 
on field competition in professional sport does not cease to exist at the 
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college level. In order to provide viewers with a competitive product with 
an uncertain champion, it is necessary to ensure competitive balance among 
the opposing teams at all levels of competition.
154
  The Act enabled 
professional sports leagues to share national television broadcasting 
revenues preserving each member team of a league, both financially and 
competitively.
155
 As the law stands, the current competitive imbalance 
among Division I College Football Teams cannot be fixed through a 
revenue distribution similar to the one achieved in professional sports. 
Current case law precedent disallows such an arrangement.  However, in 
expanding the Sports Broadcasting Act to the NCAA, the Act will work to 
provide antitrust immunity for NCAA universities, enabling weaker 
universities to become financially stable and to build more competitive 
athletic programs. An expansion of the Sports Broadcasting Act to the 
NCAA college football will enhance the product of collegiate athletics and 
the NCAA’s long-term survival as a quasi-league. 
F.  Conclusion 
 
     The Sports Broadcasting Act allowed a limited number of 
professional sports leagues to achieve a competitive balance among the 
individual teams and to preserve the leagues as a whole by permitting them 
to share television broadcasting revenues. This type of balance is lacking in 
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collegiate sports and under current law, the NCAA cannot solve the 
competitive imbalance through a pooling of broadcasting rights similar to 
the competitive imbalance solution utilized by professional leagues. This 
Note does not call for blanket antitrust immunity for the NCAA; instead, it 
provides the rationale for the same exemption granted to the NCAA’s 
professional counterparts for broadcasting regulations to be extended to the 
athletic departments of all Division I programs.  The NCAA has been 
successful in defending some of its regulatory practices; however, it has 
also been defeated in preserving many of its governing restrictions.  The 
Sports Broadcasting Act does not provide antitrust litigation immunity for 
the NCAA; although, the same issues and fears the Act was designed to 
resolve for the success of professional sporting leagues exist in today’s 
modern, college sport. This Note proposes a solution to the challenges the 
NCAA has faced in achieving the same level of competition as the 
professional leagues as well as a product that can compete with professional 
sports for many years to come. With the cooperation of individual 
universities, the NCAA, the government, and television networks, the 
wealth of collegiate athletics will be shared across the entire institutional 
industry under an expanded Sports Broadcasting Act. Allowing the NCAA 
to pool the college football broadcast rights will result in higher average 
broadcast revenues for the overwhelming majority of universities.  
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     The goal of competitive balance has justified the pooling of 
broadcast rights in a professional setting and must be transferred to college 
football broadcast rights as well.  Through the codification of antitrust 
exemption in the Sports Broadcasting Act, the product of college football 
will be able to better compete with other forms of entertainment, including 
professional sports. This change will achieve the higher broadcast revenues 
for college football teams that has been achieved on a smaller conference 
level through pooling and will act as an equilibrium for on-field 
competition.  
 
